The Role of Intelligence in Counterterrorism – Iraq, 2003 to 2008

Ilias Papadopoulos
International Relations Analyst
Geostrategic Forecasting Corporation (GSFC)
Kallithéa, Greece

In this article, we will study the role of intelligence in combating terrorism, having Iraq as a case study. We will argue that the pursuit of the counter-terrorism agenda, solely based in the use of military force, doesn’t produce positive results. On the other hand, results can be achieved by relying upon the counter-terrorism model in the use of intelligence and the application of military force, only when other avenues of action have been spent.

Defining Intelligence

Before we proceed any further, we need to define the term ‘intelligence’. For that, we will use a definition first published by M. Werner. “Intelligence is secret, state activity, to understand or influence foreign entities”(1)

Intelligence work is divided in five levels,(2) all of which institute the “intelligence cycle”. The “intelligence cycle” is the mechanism by which an intelligence agency works,(3) thus it is imperative that each level of the cycle cooperates with the others.

At the beginning of the cycle is the “Planning & Direction” level. During that step, intelligence officials direct agency’s assets towards the desired end.

At the next level is “Information Collection”. Here the agency has already established what it wants to work on and tries to collect information on the matter in question. There are three ways that an agency can do that. The first is by the use of spies and informants (human intelligence - humint); the second is by the use of technical means, e.g. satellites, interception of telephone calls or e-mails, etc. (technical intelligence – techint); and the third is by open sources, e.g. TV, radio, blogs etc. (open source intelligence – osint).

In the third level of the cycle we find “Information Processing”. During that level the already acquired information from the collection level, is processed in a way that it makes sense to the analyst. At this level for example an intercepted phone call will be translated in a language that the analyst can understand, or troop concentrations will be identified in the acquired satellite photos.

The fourth level of the cycle is the “Analysis” level. By now the analyst should have as much of the required information as he can get and should be able to compose an analysis on the matter in question. In that level, raw information is turned in intelligence and the final document produced is called “intelligence product”.

The final level of the cycle is “Dissemination”. This is when the final intelligence product leaves the agency and is handed in the appropriate policy makers/ decision makers.

Defining Terrorism

Having described how intelligence agencies work, now we will see what terrorism is and how its role has increased in modern warfare. Terrorism by itself should be considered a tactic which is employed either by itself, or in the context of a broader campaign. For an attack to qualify as “terrorism” it must comply with four criteria.(4) These criteria are i) the action must use or threaten to use violence, ii) the incentives for that action must be political in the broader sense (political, religious, philosophical, etc), iii) the action must have far reaching psychological repercussions in the target (that might be the demoralization of a society and/or of the armed forces), iv) be conducted by a non-state actor.(5)

The phenomenon, albeit not new at all, has an increased impact in modern affairs mainly for two reasons. The first is the contemporary Revolution in Military Affairs (RMA). This is the development of technology at a level that a small group of people could cause disproportionate damage with relatively cheap materials.(6) The second reason is that RMA allows even a small group of highly-motivated people to press for their agenda by forcible means. While in the past a vast conscription pool was required for war to be conducted, a pool that only states could possess, this is not the case today. Only one man with an explosive vest could cause mass casualties and with only low-cost materials. This new reality allows non-state actors to conduct war-like operations.

The Nature of War in Iraq and the Role of Intelligence in the War

While operations from this ‘new kind of war’ cannot defeat conventional forces in the field of battle, they can engage them in an asymmetric way that regular forces could not retaliate against the terrorists. Such was the nature of the Iraq War after the occupation of the country. Small armed groups set Improvised Explosive Devices (IEDs), causing casualties in both the civilian population and coalition forces.(7) Other practices included attacks with Rocket-Propelled Grenades (RPGs) and small arms, and abduction of civilians that subsequently were tortured and killed. The latter practice was especially favored by Al Qaeda in Iraq, which beheaded its hostages and subsequently posted the act on the Internet to further terrorize the population.(8)

This violence was perpetrated by a multitude of indigenous and foreign groups that were active in Iraq soon after the fall of the Ba’ath regime. These groups can be categorized in two ways: the first is their ethnic/ religious composition, and the second is the goals they seek to achieve.(9)

For the first part, we can identify: i) Kurds, ii) Sunni Arabs, iii) Shi’a Arabs, iv) Foreigners. For the second part, we can identify the following goals: a) political power in the post-Saddam era, b) religious reasons in the context of fighting a Jihad, c) separation from Iraq.

Soon after the invasion, many armed groups appeared with different ethnic composition, different goals and different methods. With the exception of Kurdish Pash Merga that remained distance from the sectarian violence, all other groups turned one against the other, and all of them turned against coalition forces. With Saddam gone, sectarian violence began to emerge all over the country, dragging Iraq in a de facto civil war.(10) But besides the civil war, these groups also turned against coalition forces, which they saw as an illegitimate occupation force or, in the case of Islamist extremists, as “crusaders”.

Against the formed situation, coalition forces – and particularly Americans that bore the main weight of the operations – were unprepared. Their forces were trained and equipped to achieve a fast conventional victory, but not to engage in operations of the “new kind of war”. The last similar experience for the U.S. army was Vietnam and since then, little had been done to fight such wars with success.(11)

After the occupation, the position of Administrator of the Provisional Authority in Iraq went to Ambassador Paul Bremmer III. His choice to demobilize the Iraqi military impacted heavily the amount of terrorism in the country, since this decision opened a large conscription pool for the illegitimate armed groups of the country. The Sunni element of the country was particularly affected, since it constituted the main body of officers in the pre-war army. Thus it was only logical for them to try to expel the Americans from the country and regain part of their former power. This notion became even clearer when all government officials of the Ba’ath government were expelled from the administration.(12)

Besides political mistakes, the Americans also lacked the appropriate number of troops on the ground to ensure order in the country.(13) This allowed the terrorists greater freedom of movement and eventually the ability to control large areas in the country. But the greatest shortcoming in the counterterrorism strategy was the counterterrorism model itself. Ambassador Bremmer, soon after he assumed command of the country, decided that he would pursuit his goal via the “war model”.(14)

This model meant that areas that were ‘suspected’ of harboring terrorists would be searched by the military in a forceful way. This practically lead to people be dragged from their beds in the middle of the night and their homes searched for weapons and explosives.(15) This strategy particularly targeted Sunni elements of the society and fueled the cycle of violence in the country.

In that model, intelligence played a secondary role. The administration believed that these agencies were better suited to vet ex-Ba’ath personnel than to run intelligence networks and identify the terrorists in the country(16). That meant that flaws were in the very beginning of the cycle, in the ‘planning and direction’ level. Furthermore, this model deterred Iraqis from cooperating with the intelligence communities practically severing the ‘collection’ level. President Bush, for example, informs us that intelligence tips in the country were only 12,500 per month, while when the counterterrorism model changed this number doubled(17).

In summary, the “war model” was responsible for the relegation of intelligence agencies in the counterterrorism work and for the increase in terrorist attacks in the country, since the civilians felt that their way of life and their position in the society was at jeopardy. That gave them the incentive to either join a terrorist cell, or to passively help the terrorists by not turning them in to the authorities.

The cycle of violence kept mounting until in 2007, when the Bush administration lost the midterm elections and was forced politically to do something in Iraq. What was decided was a troop increase of 28,500 troops(18). The commander that would implement this “Surge”, as this came to be called, was general David H. Petraeus who took command of the Multi National Force I (MNF I) on February 10, 2007.(19).

The new strategy that the general quickly implemented was twofold. For the first part, he turned the safety of the Iraqi population into a priority for the coalition forces. The second part was that he gradually decreased the use of force against the local population and opened diplomatic conduits with them. Violence came to be the coalition forces’ last resort and only when all other methods of approach had failed.(20)

This strategy brought intelligence agencies back to the frontline against terrorism. The legitimization of the new administration in the eyes of most Iraqis meant that they believed coalition forces could better protect them than the terrorist cells did in the past. This in turn allowed the intelligence tips to increase and the intelligence agencies to sufficiently pursue the various terrorist organizations on the country. This resulted in a steep fall of terror attacks, both against civilian and military targets.(21)

What changed in intelligence thinking was primarily the ‘planning & direction’ level. While in the past intelligence worked on background checks for the ex-Ba’ath officials, from 2007 they started trying to identify terrorist cells in the country.

Their work was eased by the legitimization of the new doctrine in the eyes of Iraqi society. As we mentioned earlier, the established counterterrorism model of the previous era deterred Iraqi civilians from cooperating with the administration. The new doctrine allowed that to change. With the society convinced that it was in their interest to work with the new government of their country, they started supplying the intelligences services with information. This in turn greatly improved the ‘collection’ level of intelligence agencies, and resistively the final intelligence product.

Limits in Intelligence: The Case of Basra

Despite its successes, we also should identify the limits of intelligence in counterterrorism operations. When the terrorists’ demands are extreme, and the concessions they demand cannot be given by the government, or when the support of violence is not limited to a few leaders that drive the society, intelligence fails to play a prominent role. This is because intelligence cannot identify and pursue select elements of the society that are responsible for the terrorist acts, leaving the rest of the population untouched.

Such was the case in Basra, a safe haven for a radical Shi’a organization called the “Mahdi Army” (MA). MA had repeatedly attacked Iraqi and coalition forces, while it was also systematically killing Sunni civilians.(22) After the new Iraqi administration failed to bring the MA into the newly-formed democratic process, president Nouri al-Maliki finally decided that a military solution was necessary. Although the operation in March 2008 turned into a fiasco, it was largely legitimized in the eyes of iraqi society. The operation was authorized by Iraqi Prime Minister al-Maliqi and was conducted exclusively by Iraqi troops.

Conclusion

Conclusively, we believe that the role intelligence plays in counterterrorism work is directly connected with the counterterrorism model in effect. We showed that when the model employed was the ‘war model’, the role of intelligence was low, and the results poor. Subsequently, when the model shifted, the role of intelligence became a major factor in counterterrorism work.

We also conclude that the amount of humint the agency has available is the primary means to pursue a counter-terrorism agenda. In order for humint to be acquired, especially in cases where whole areas are controlled by the terrorists, the agency must have tips from the local community, and for the locals to provide those tips they must be persuaded that it is in their best interests to do so.

Thus it is imperative that the agency responsible for counterterrorism wins the hearts and minds of the local population. What we saw in Iraq is that when this principle was not adhered to, terrorism flourished. When intelligence was allowed to play its role in identifying terrorist cells and persecuting them in a socially, not necessarily legal, but legitimized context, the results were far better.

Of course, we cannot claim that intelligence by itself can win the fight against terror. The case of Basra bears witness for that. But intelligence is the first and most delicate line of defense against the phenomenon and not to make the most out of its capabilities would be a waste that states can ill afford to make in their struggle for security.

References

(1) See Michael Warner, “Wanted: A Definition of ‘Intelligence’ ”, at Studies in Intelligence, Vol. 46, No. 3, 2002.

(2) Some scolars believe that the “intelligence cycle” is comprised of 2 extra levels, adding one at the begining and one at the end of the cycle. These levels connect the intelligence process to the political field (political requirements in the begining of the cycle, political feedback in the end). In this article we want to study strictly the work of intelligence agencies and thus we will not consider political-intelligence relations. More for that view of intelligence, see Mark Lowenthal, Intelligence: From Secrets to Policy, 4th ed., CQ Press, Washington DC, 2009, p. 56-60 & p. 64-65.

(3) For more on the “intelligence cycle”, see Loch K. Johnson, “Sketches for a Theory of Strategic Intelligence”, published in Peter Gill, Stephen Marrin and Mark Phythian, Intelligence Theory: Key questions and debates, Routledge, New York, 2009, p. 34-53.

(4) There is a multitude of definitions on “terrorism”. For example some of them believe that a terrorist attack must exclusively target civilians. See Daniel Byman, Deadly Connections: States that Sponsor Terrorism, Cambridge University Press, Cambridge, 2005 p. 8. We find the civilian – non civilian qualification to be vague. For example an off duty officer is a ivilian or not?

(5) Our definition of terrorism is based on the one by Bruce Hoffman. For more on that see Bruce Hoffman, Inside Terrorism, Columbia University Press, New York, 2006, p. 20-41.

(6) For more on that, see Tom Lansford and Jack Covarrubias, “The Limits of Military Power:The United States in Iraq” published in Tom Lansford, Robert P. Watson, Jack Covarrubias, America’s War on Terror, Ashgate, Hampshire, 2009, p. 169 – 181.

(7) See Bruce R. Pirnie, Edward O’Connell, Counterinsurgency in Iraq (2003-2006), RAND, Santa Monica, 2008, p. 44 – 46.

(8) See Gabriel Weimann, “How modern terrorism uses the internet”, στο Special Report 116, United States Institute of Peace, March, 2004, p. 5-6.

(9) More information for the post-invasion armed groups, see Bruce R. Pirnie, Edward O’Connell, Counterinsurgency in Iraq (2003-2006), RAND, Santa Monica, 2008, p. 21-35.

(10) See David H. Naylor, Al Qaeda in Iraq, Nova Science Publishers, New York, 2009 David J. Kilcullen, Oxford University Press, Oxford, 2010, p. 12-13.

(11) See Robert M. Cassidy, Counterinsurgency and the Global War on Terror: Military Culture and Irregular War, Praeger Security International, Westport, 2006, p 99-100.

(12) More on Bremmer’s actions in Iraq, see L. Paul Bremmer III, My Year in Iraq: The Struggle to Build a Future of Hope, Simon & Schuster, New York, 2006, p.50-78.

(13) See Bruce R. Pirnie, Edward O’Connell, Counterinsurgency in Iraq (2003-2006), RAND, Santa Monica, 2008, p. 69-71.

(14) More on the counterterrorism model implemented in Iraq, see Steven Metz, Learning from Iraq: Counterinsurgency in American Strategy, Strategic Studies Institute, 2007, p. 31-35.

(15) See Scilla Elworthy, Learning from Fallujah: Lessons Identified, 2003-2005, Oxford, 2005 p.7.

(16) See Bruce R. Pirnie, Edward O’Connell, Counterinsurgency in Iraq (2003-2006), RAND, Santa Monica, 2008, p. 70-72.

(17) See George W. Bush, Decision Points, Crown Publishers, New York, 2010, p. 380-381.

(18) See David H. Naylor, Al Qaeda in Iraq, Nova Science Publishers, New York, 2009, p. 72.

(19) More on general Petreus and his background, see William A. Knowlton Jr., The Surge: General Petaeus and the Turnaraound in Iraq, National Defence University Press, Washington D.C., 2010, p. 1-4.

(20) For an overview of the new counterterrorism model, see William A. Knowlton Jr., The Surge: General Petaeus and the Turnaraound in Iraq, National Defence University Press, Washington D.C., 2010, p. 7-9.

(21) For a quantitative depiction of security factors (attacks, victims etc), see Charts to Accompany the Testimony of Gen. David H. Petreus, Multi National Force-Iraq, 2008.

(22) More for those incidents, See David H. Naylor, Al Qaeda in Iraq, Nova Science Publishers, New York, 2009 David J. Kilcullen, Oxford University Press, Oxford, 2010, p. 65-68.

About the Author

Ilias Papadopoulos (MPhil) is an International Relations Analyst for Geostrategic Forecasting Corporation (GSFC).

GSFC is a content partner of the CBRN Resource Network.